Background: The tort system is supposed to help improve the quality and safety of health care, but whether it actually does so is controversial. Most previous studies modeling the effect of negligence litigation on quality of care are ecologic.
D eterrence is a key objective of the tort system. 1 According to classic deterrence theory, by imposing economic penalties and reputational costs on health care providers who cause negligent harm, litigation creates incentives to be more careful, thereby improving the quality of care. 2 Deterrence theorists have described 2 distinct mechanisms of action. 3, 4 "General deterrence" refers to the threat of being sued or punished that prevails in society at large: potential wrongdoers watch their step because they recognize they may be visited by legal sanctions if they do not. "Specific deterrence" arises from direct personal experience: wrongdoers who are sanctioned become less likely to reoffend.
How well medical malpractice, one branch of the tort system, deters substandard care has long been a subject of intense debate. 5 The plaintiff's bar argues that it operates as an important check on unsafe care. Physicians and liability insurers agree that malpractice litigation influences care delivery but argue that the influence manifests as "defensive medicine," negatively impacting the quality of care. This debate endures partly because extant research on malpractice litigation's deterrent value has substantial weaknesses. 5 The standard approach taken by studies of deterrence in the medical liability system involves correlating providers' litigation exposure-as measured by the volume of malpractice claims or payments, the costs of liability insurance, or the mix of tort reforms in force in the practice environment-with patient outcomes. In general, these studies [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] have detected little or no effect of litigation on quality.
A notable weakness of these studies is their ecologic nature: they aggregate measures of litigation exposure, health outcomes, or both at the state or regional level. 11 Ecologic analyses can only provide estimates of general deterrence. Testing for specific deterrence requires linking longitudinal data on litigation experiences with health outcomes at the provider level ( Fig. 1) . This is logistically difficult across large numbers of providers, because largescale, longitudinal data repositories, containing both quality and claims data, are rare.
These data obstacles explain the predominant research focus on general deterrence; it may also explain why no robust connection between litigation and quality has been detected. For the experience of being sued or paying damages to affect a small minority of providers and then impact the average performance of the wider group to which those providers belong, it would have to be a potent force indeed. By contrast, the relationship between a provider's experience with litigation's tribulations and costs and that provider's own performance is likely to be stronger. That is, if deterrence works, specific deterrence is likely to be its most sensitive expression.
In contrast to acute care, several features of the nursing home sector facilitate investigations of specific deterrence. Regarding quality, process and outcome measures are routinely collected for nearly all nursing homes in the United States and are widely used in research. Regarding litigation, claims typically target facilities as defendants. Thus, nursing home quality measurement and claims activity both converge at the level of the facility. In addition, the dominance prominence of large nursing home chains provides natural aggregation points for data on the claims experiences of many facilities.
We analyzed the relationship between the litigation experience and quality performance of nearly 1500 facilities across 48 states. Specifically, we assessed the effect of being sued and making payments on health outcomes and compliance with regulatory standards. If specific deterrence operates as tort theory suggests, quality should improve in the wake of lawsuits. However, litigation could have the opposite effect, undercutting performance, as resources that otherwise would have been directed to maintaining and improving quality are absorbed in defending and paying claims.
METHODS

Data
We obtained data on all tort claims brought against facilities owned by 5 of the largest US nursing home chains. The claims closed between 1998 and 2010. We defined a claim as a written demand for compensation for injury arising from care. Our data included all claims, regardless of whether they resulted in indemnity payments or whether they were resolved in or out of court. The information on each claim included the type of injury alleged; dates of the incident, claim filing, and claim closure; the amount of indemnity (if any) paid to the plaintiff; and the administrative costs incurred in defending the claim.
Nursing home data came from 2 sources: the Minimum Data Set (MDS) facility-level quality indicator/quality measure system and the On-line Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) system. MDS measures are designed to track residents' functional, cognitive, and affective levels, and facilities have been required to collect these data at least quarterly since June 1998. Facility-level MDS measures have demonstrated good reliability and validity in measuring nursing home quality. [12] [13] [14] From the MDS variables, we selected 5 measures of interest: pressure ulcers among "high-risk" residents; pressure ulcers among "low-risk" residents; use of physical restraints; late-loss activities of daily living decline; and urinary tract infections (Appendix 1, Supplemental Digital Content, http://links.lww.com/MLR/A441, for details on all quality measures). Values for these variables indicate the prevalence of the condition in a facility's residents; hence, higher values suggest lower quality. Groups of these measures have been used in previous studies of nursing home quality and, together, provide a reasonable moment-in-time snapshot of quality of care. [15] [16] [17] The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Systems collect and maintain OSCAR data, consisting of survey and certification data for all Medicaid-certified and Medicarecertified nursing homes in the United States. 18 State regulators must inspect facilities at least once every 15 months, and the average time between inspections is approximately 1 year. Facilities also submit facility, resident, and staffing information. When a facility is found to be out of compliance with federal regulatory standards, a deficiency is recorded, noting its type, scope, and severity.
From the OSCAR variables, we selected 4 measures of interest: number of deficiencies identified on inspection; number of serious deficiencies (violations involving actual harm or immediate jeopardy to residents) 19 ; and registered nurse and nurse aide staffing (both specified as hours per resident day). To eliminate erroneous values, we followed previously used methods. 20, 21 OSCAR data are widely used as quality measures in research. [15] [16] [17] Although limitations have been identified, 22 OSCAR data are the most comprehensive source of facility-level information on nursing homes' operations, resident characteristics, and regulatory compliance.
In addition to the claims and quality variables, we extracted from OSCAR and added to both datasets other facility characteristics, including resident census, resident acuity, and payer-mix. Analyses of the relationships of interest adjusted for these variables.
Using these longitudinal data, we constructed 2 analytic datasets. One dataset consisted of the litigation claims data merged with MDS data at the facility calendar-quarter level (facility-quarter). The second dataset consisted of litigation claims data merged with OSCAR data at the facility-OSCAR inspection period level (facility-inspection period). In merging the litigation claims data with the nursing home data, claims were assigned to the MDS facility-quarter or OSCAR inspection period in which the claim was closed. (When a claim results in an indemnity payment to the plaintiff, the closure date is normally the date at which payment is made.)
Analysis
We used random-effects multivariable regression analysis to estimate the relationship between each facility's litigation experience during an "exposure period" and the quality of care immediately after the exposure period. The outcome variables were, respectively, the 5 MDS quality measures and the 4 OSCAR quality measures described above. Each outcome of interest was modeled separately. Significance levels were not adjusted for multiple comparisons. The predictor of interest was each facility's litigation experience over time. We tested 3 different specifications of litigation experience: (i) the sum of indemnity payments made in the exposure period (linear variable in 2010 dollars, log transformed); (ii) the sum of indemnity payments plus administrative costs in the exposure period (linear variable in 2010 dollars, log transformed); and (iii) whether 1 or more indemnity payments were made in the exposure period (binary variable). Figure 2 depicts our analytic approach. The shaded area represents the exposure period. In analyses involving the MDS measures, the exposure period consisted of 6 consecutive quarters (18 mo); the predictors of interest-the 3 litigation variables described above-were calculated over this exposure period and tested against each MDS quality measure in successive regression models. The analyses involving the OSCAR measures adopted the same approach, except the exposure period was 2 consecutive inspection periods-intervals ranging from 18 to 30 months, depending on when surveyor inspections occurred.
Choosing the duration of the exposure periods was a balancing exercise. On the one hand, we sought to allow sufficient time for a facility's litigation experience to exert an effect (positive or negative) on its care quality. On the other hand, we sought to minimize the potential for the quality of the facility to be influenced by factors other than litigation.
All models controlled for quality at baseline, which was specified as the value of the quality measure under analysis immediately before the exposure period (Fig. 1 ). The other covariates in the models were: the facilities' resident census, acuity, and payer-mix (averaged over each exposure period); dummy-coded variables indicating the chain to which each facility belonged; dummy-coded variables for each year to capture linear time-trends; and facility and state random-effects. SEs were adjusted for autocorrelation among the residuals.
We log transformed the MDS quality measures to stabilize the variance of the residuals; for consistency in presentation, we did the same for the OSCAR measures. Because the outcome variables and the 2 continuous predictors are on the log scale, the coefficients in our models indicate the percentage change in quality associated with a percentage change in litigation costs. For simplicity, we present the effects on quality of doubling the litigation cost variables.
RESULTS
Characteristics of Negligence Claims
Plaintiffs filed 6471 claims against the 1514 nursing homes in our sample during the study period. On average, facilities experienced a claim every 2 years (annual mean, 0.53; SD, 0.57), although there was substantial variation across homes in their litigation experience. A total of 5226 (81%) of these claims had closed by the date of data extraction. All results reported hereafter relate only to the closed claims.
Expenditures on the closed claims totaled $968 million, consisting of $785 million in indemnity payments and $182 million in administrative costs. Two thirds of plaintiffs received payments at an average of $226,647 per paid claim ( Table 1 ). The most prevalent types of harm alleged in the claims were falls (25.6% of claims), pressure ulcers (13.2%), and dehydration, malnutrition, or weight loss (6.7%).
Characteristics of Nursing Homes
On average, the nursing homes had approximately 0.5 registered nurse hours per resident day and 2.1 nurse aide hours per resident day ( Table 2) . OSCAR surveys identified an average of 7.0 deficiencies and 0.5 serious deficiencies per facility inspection. Mean quarterly rates for the 5 MDS measures ranged from 3.3% of low-risk residents with 
Impact of Claims Payments on Quality
Twenty-three of the 27 relationships examined showed a negative association between exposure to litigation and subsequent performance on quality (Table 3 ). In other words, higher litigation costs were associated with lower subsequent quality. However, only 4 of these associations were statistically significant, and the effect sizes were small.
In the OSCAR analyses, a doubling of indemnity payments made over the preceding 2 inspection periods was associated with a 1.1% increase in the number of deficiencies, and doubling of total indemnity plus administrative costs was associated with a 0.8% increase in deficiencies. In the MDS analyses, a doubling of total indemnity and administrative costs made over the preceding 18 months period was associated with a 2.2% increase in pressure ulcer rates. Finally, facilities that made 1 or more indemnity payments had a 3.1% higher rate of pressure ulcers among high-risk residents than facilities that made no indemnity payments. Detection of these 4 significant associations in 27 separate tests of association may have been due to chance alone. None of the other 23 combinations of litigation and quality variables were significant at the P < 0.05 level, although several were close.
Sensitivity Analyses
To test whether our findings were sensitive to our specifications of litigation experience, we allowed the predictors to take nonzero values only if their accumulated dollar value over the exposure period exceeded $10,000. The coefficients changed in these analyses, but the overall story was very similar: only 3 of 27 associations were statistically significant, and all effects were small.
We also ran subanalyses examining the relationship between specific outcome measures and claims in which the injury complained of was that particular outcome. This was possible for 2 outcomes (falls and pressure ulcers). Neither of these targeted subanalyses showed a statistically significant relationship between payment and subsequent quality.
DISCUSSION
This longitudinal study of more than 1500 nursing homes found little relationship between payments of damages by facilities in negligence litigation and the subsequent quality of care they delivered. Across a range of different measures of litigation experience and facility quality, only a few significant relationships were detected, and they were small inverse associations between levels of payment and levels of subsequent performance. In summary, our findings suggest that tort litigation has no substantial association-positive or negativewith quality of care in the nursing home sector.
Only a few studies have linked litigation experiences with quality performance at the provider level, and they have substantial limitations. In a sample of obstetricians practicing in Florida between 1977 and 1983, Sloan et al 23 found no significant associations between claim frequency and any of the 5 birth outcomes. A weakness of this study was its crosssectional design, which limited its ability to control for confounding and infer causal relationships. Another study consisted of a series of investigations conducted during and after the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS). 5 On the basis of the review of over 30,000 randomly selected patient records and malpractice claims files in New York State in 1984, researchers investigated the association between hospitals' past claims experience and their current costs per admission and adverse event rates. The original attempts by HMPS investigators to find a relationship were inconclusive. 5,10 A later, more sophisticated reanalysis of the data found a negative association between the number of claims against hospitals and their subsequent adverse event rates, but none of the other outcome-exposure combinations tested showed significant relationships. 5 One weakness of the HMPS deterrence analyses was that the main quality measure used, hospital adverse event rates, was cross-sectional, because it was obtained during a single medical record review. More problematic was the misalignment between the litigation and quality measures: the HMPS analyses linked litigation brought against physicians working in the hospitals to hospital-level quality indicators. 10 A third study by Troyer and Thompson 25 assessed the impact of claims against nursing homes on inspection-related quality measures, finding a modestly negative impact of claims on quality. However, these analyses were largely exploratory in nature, included only 48 malpractice claims, and focused on a single state (Florida) for the time period 1993-1997. By using longitudinal information on quality performance and litigation experience and ensuring that the locus of both measures was the same, our study avoids the design problems of earlier investigations of specific deterrence. We provide strong evidence that the tort system is failing to fulfill its deterrence function, at least within the nursing home sector. Indeed, our findings suggest that if negligence litigation is having any effect on quality, it is a mildly damaging one.
Why does negligence litigation fall short on its promise to improve quality and safety? There are several possible explanations. First, the tort system's quality improvement signal may be thwarted by poor targeting. Previous studies suggest that negligence litigation lacks precision, chiefly in finding and penalizing instances of medical injury and substandard care, 26, 27 and to a lesser extent in assigning indemnity payments to worthy plaintiffs once claims are made. 28 In an earlier analysis of the same sample of nursing homes, we found that high-quality facilities were only marginally less likely to be sued for negligence than their lowerperforming counterparts and hypothesized then that such weak discrimination may subvert litigation's capacity to affect quality. 11 Findings from the current study provide empirical support for that hypothesis.
Second, tort scholars have suggested that cost externalization blunts deterrence by partially insulating wrongdoers from litigation's economic costs. 5, 29, 30 This potential blocking is particularly salient in the context of medical malpractice, wherein most physicians carry deep, first-dollar liability coverage with million dollar limits, and premiums are generally community-rated within specialties. Among the facilities we studied, the insurance buffer operated in a different way. The facilities were parts of chains that tended to self-insure for liability risk up to a threshold dollar amount and purchase insurance to cover losses above that threshold. For individual facilities, the chain's selfinsurance fund and the external liability insurance covered their litigation costs. However, some costs of defending and paying claims were passed down to individual facilities through accounting mechanisms tying elements of their budgets to claims experience. This is consistent with a general trend among nursing home chains toward corporate shielding practices that involve locating greater legal and fiscal responsibility at the facility level. 31 Third, the lags between incident occurrence, claim filing, and claim closure may further attenuate the potential for the experience of making a payment to influence care practices. The median time between the incident and filing dates in our sample was 157 days, and it was 511 days between filing and case closure. Although these average intervals are considerably shorter than equivalents in acute care litigation, 28 they imply that individuals involved in particular allegations (eg, administrators and direct-care staff) may no longer be facility employees when sanctions arrive, 32 potentially undercutting opportunities for institutional learning.
Fourth, nursing homes are highly regulated, 33 with heavy government involvement in quality assurance. This form of oversight is regular and predictable. If facilities' quality improvement efforts are oriented toward fulfilling regulatory requirements, it may contract the sphere of influence for litigation. From the facilities' perspective, tort litigation could look relatively irregular and unpredictable, and the returns from organizing to try to avert it may be less certain.
Finally, some tort scholars may reject the premise that negligence litigation ought to be held accountable for improving quality and safety. Technically, negligence law's focus is care that falls below acceptable professional standards 1 ; it has no mandate to sanction care that is "merely" suboptimal or below average. Thus, the measures of quality we examined may be the wrong ones. To illustrate by extreme scenario, if all the facilities we observed consistently delivered non-negligent care, the absence of a boost in quality after litigation would say nothing about how well tort law was performing its deterrence function.
Although technically correct, this objection is unsatisfactory. Unsafe care processes are likely to elevate risks of adverse events across the board, from the kind of quality decrements we examined to negligent errors. 34 More important, as we have argued elsewhere, 11 stripping the deterrence function down to the discouragement of isolated episodes of negligent care, and delinking it from aspirations to lift institutional performance more broadly, sets its sights very low indeed. Such a meager conception of deterrence is out of step with the foundational status and attention that deterrence is accorded in tort law.
Our study design has limitations that are important to note. First, the experience of nursing homes from the 5 chains studied may not generalize to other facilities or health care sectors. In particular, it is unclear how generalizable our findings are to tort litigation in the acute care sector, wherein individual clinicians are the chief targets of claims and different allegation types prevail (eg, missed diagnoses and technical errors). 35 Second, although our results were robust to targeted analyses matching quality measures to the allegations that led to payouts (eg, pressure ulcers), the measures we used to characterize quality may not have captured fully facilities' responses to litigation payments; indeed, some aspects of facilities' quality response may be unmeasured. 36 Third, to the extent that the facilities' parent companies shouldered the financial burden of claims, we may have overestimated the facilities true exposure to the duress of litigation.
Tort litigation against health care providers is supposed to improve the quality and safety of health care. This study of nursing home care, designed to detect the subtlest form of deterrence, found none. It joins a mounting body of evidence that tort litigation does not improve health care quality. Virtually all the tort reforms debated over the last 4 decades in the United States, including those targeting nursing homes, 35 have been designed to reduce litigation's scale and cost. A common objection to more sweeping reforms, such as non-negligencebased administrative approaches to compensation, is that they would pose an unacceptable threat to tort litigation's quality assurance role. 37, 38 It may be time to accept that this rationale for the current system is misguided, and refocus attention on reforms that would enhance the system's capacity to achieve its other chief function-compensation.
